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  Studies suggest that typically developing (TD) individuals verbally mediate theory of 
mind (ToM). Given that language deficits and ToM deficits are central to autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), and given evidence that people with ASD may utilize visuospatial rather than 
verbal mediation, we sought to examine the role of language inner speech in ToM among 
adolescents with ASD. We utilized a false belief location-change dual task paradigm to examine 
whether a simultaneous verbal task, which inhibits inner speech, would differentially interfere 
with false belief task performance in participants with ASD. We predicted that results would 
indicate less reliance on inner speech among participants with ASD as compared to TD, and that 
language skills would be uniquely associated with ToM performance. Contrary to predictions 
and to the larger ToM literature, we found no group difference in false belief performance, and 
no additional decrement with verbal load. False belief performance was uniquely associated with 
VIQ within the ASD group, suggesting a critical role of language in ASD. This finding calls into 
question the theory that people with ASD "think in pictures" rather than words. Findings were 
consistent with a proposal that ToM involves both an implicit and an explicit system (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009): because people with ASD struggle with the former, they draw more heavily on 
an explicit ToM system to compensate for this deficit. Because verbal mediation is necessary for 
explicit cognitive tasks, such as explicit ToM, people with ASD may, in fact, rely on verbal 
mediation to “bootstrap” their ToM. 
  Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, verbal mediation, inner speech, theory of mind, 
dual task 
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Do adolescents with high-functioning autism verbally mediate theory of mind? 
 
The relationship between language and thought is an ongoing topic of debate among 
psycholinguists. Inner speech, or “intrapersonal communication,” is defined as thought in the 
form of language that is internal to oneself. According to Vygotsky (1987), linguistic thought is 
the primary medium for representing and relating abstract concepts and the foundation for 
flexible cognition and self-regulation. Vygotsky (1987) argued that linguistically-mediated 
interpersonal exchanges with caregivers early in life serve to regulate the child’s emotions and 
behavior; over time, these dialogues become more intrapersonal, and the child is able to regulate 
herself through overt self-talk or “private speech” (Winsler & Naglieri, 2003). By middle-
childhood, this self-talk becomes internalized as inner speech. 
In children with ASD, however, social and communication deficits are present from early 
in development. By the Vygotskian (1987) account that internalization of speech is scaffolded by 
social dialogue, people with ASD may demonstrate diminished private, or “inner” speech 
(Fernyhough, 1996). Given the importance of inner speech for higher-order mental processes, 
such as theorizing about the minds of others, as reviewed below, and given the prevalence of 
theory of mind (ToM) deficits among people with ASD, we were interested in exploring whether 
people with ASD verbally mediate ToM. In the current study, we examined the role of inner 
speech in ToM reasoning among adolescents with high-functioning ASD and typical 
development (TD).  
 Inner speech supports higher-order thought. Several studies have demonstrated that 
inner speech mediates higher-order thought and executive control (Barkley, 1997). A common 
way of assessing the contribution of inner speech to the execution of cognitive tasks is to 
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examine task performance when inner speech is suppressed, often by increasing verbal load via 
articulation of a repeated word or phrase. Such studies find that inner speech is selectively 
disrupted, as shown by reduced recall of verbally-encoded information while repeating a word 
aloud (Murray, 1967), while visuospatial encoding is preserved, as shown by intact spatial-
sequence recall during articulatory suppression (Vandierendonck, Kemps, Fastame, & Szmalec, 
2004). If a cognitive task requires verbal mediation, performing the task under a condition of 
verbal load hinders task performance. 
Using this dual task methodology, Baddeley, Chincotta, and Adlam (2001) found that 
verbal load selectively interferes with the ability to alternate between mental operations such as 
addition and subtraction, suggesting that inner speech mediates task switching. Studies have also 
found that inner speech suppression selectively interferes with tower task performance (Lidstone, 
Meins, & Fernyhough, 2010) and that, in young children, private speech use correlates with 
tower task performance (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005), suggesting that inner speech also 
mediates the executive function of planning. Together, these findings suggest that language 
serves as a primary medium through which people internally inhibit and plan behavior, and hold 
in mind and link together competing representations or concepts (Carruthers, 2002). 
Language and theory of mind. One type of higher-order thought central to the human 
experience is our ability to theorize about the minds of others. Theory of mind (ToM) involves 
understanding that other people have ideas and beliefs that are distinct from one’s own, and thus 
allows for the attribution of mental states, such as thoughts, feelings, desires, and beliefs, to 
others. False belief reasoning, or the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs regardless of 
the veracity of these beliefs, is often taken as a proxy for the broader construct of ToM. A variety 
of experimental tasks are used to test belief reasoning, including location-change false belief 
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tasks and appearance-reality tasks. Both of these tasks involve an explicit dissociation of reality 
from another person’s (incorrect) belief, as well as the ability to inhibit the default “true” 
response in favor of the “false belief” response. Belief reasoning emerges in early childhood; 
typically developing children begin to pass false belief tasks at age four (Wellman, 1990). 
Representing another person’s mental state requires holding in mind multiple 
representations and involves executive demands, such as planning (Carlson, Mandell, & 
Williams, 2004) and inhibitory control (Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009). Several authors have 
suggested that the development of executive functions is integral to the development of ToM 
(Carlson et al., 2004). Therefore, language may offer a unique medium not only for executive 
functions, but also for representing the mental states of others. Deaf children who learn sign 
language at an early age perform better on false belief tasks than late sign language learners (de 
Villiers & de Villiers, 2005; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). Moreover, a meta-analysis found a 
significant relationship between language skills and false belief competence independent of age 
among children younger than age 7, with language ability accounting for 18% of the variance 
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). 
There are, in fact, specific linguistic structures that may be critical for representing 
mental states. Sentences with a primary clause and a complement clause with a belief verb (such 
as “think,” “assume,” and “hope”) serve to represent the mental state of another person. For 
example, in the sentence “Sally thinks that Bob is sleeping,” [Bob is sleeping] is the primary 
clause, and [Sally thinks that] is the complement clause. The structure of this sentence provides 
simultaneous representation of two distinct realities: Sally thinks that Bob is sleeping although 
Bob may be awake (de Villiers, 2007). 
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 Inner speech and theory of mind. To directly test the hypothesis that inner speech 
mediates belief reasoning, Newton and de Villiers (2007) conducted a study presenting a belief-
reasoning task while inner speech was or was not suppressed. The study used a between-subject 
design; half of the participants completed a computerized belief-reasoning task (half of whom 
completed a false belief task in which a puppet places an object under a box and leaves, another 
puppet enters the room and moves the object to one of two other boxes, and the first puppet re-
enters the room; the other half of whom completed a true belief task, which was the same as the 
above mentioned task except that the first puppet remains in the room when the object is moved). 
While completing the belief-reasoning task, participants performed either a verbal load task 
(shadowing a complex narrative) to suppress their inner speech. The other participants performed 
either the false or true belief task along with a nonverbal load task (tapping in rhythms), 
presumably imposing a similar cognitive load, but without disrupting inner speech. False belief 
accuracy was high for the nonverbal load group, but at chance for the verbal load group, 
suggesting that inner speech uniquely mediates ToM. 
 Theory of mind in ASD. Deficits and delays in ToM are considered a central feature in 
ASD. Whereas typically developing children begin to pass belief-reasoning tasks at around four 
years of age (Wellman, 1990), children with ASD do not pass these tasks until age nine, on 
average (Happé & Frith, 1996). For children with ASD, the severity of social deficits is 
associated with belief-reasoning deficits (Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 1994). Interestingly, children 
with ASD use belief language less frequently than their typically developing peers (Lind & 
Bowler, 2009), and production of sentence complements among children with ASD is associated 
with belief reasoning ability (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). 
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 Inner speech and theory of mind in ASD. Several studies have demonstrated that people 
with ASD rely less on inner speech to mediate and mentally represent information. For example, 
evidence from fMRI studies suggests that people with ASD rely more heavily on visuospatial 
than on linguistic strategies when thinking about abstract information (Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, 
Minshew, & Just, 2006). Several studies have found that suppressing inner speech in ASD 
causes less performance decrement during set-shifting (Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006) 
or planning (Wallace, Silvers, Martin, & Kenworthy, 2009; Williams, Bowler, & Jarrold, 2012), 
suggesting less verbal mediation of executive tasks among people with ASD. Engaging in FB 
tasks requires top down executive processing, including set shifting, planning, and inhibitory 
control. Individuals with ASD may rely less on inner speech to mediate both executive and ToM 
tasks. 
It appears that individuals with ASD demonstrate less verbal mediation of executive 
functions. However, findings do indicate that inner speech suppression affects short-term 
memory in ASD (Williams et al., 2012), suggesting that, unlike executive functions, people with 
ASD verbally mediate short-term memory. Fernyhough (2008) proposed an interesting 
explanation for this discrepancy: whereas monologic inner speech affords linear processes, such 
as short-term and working memory (e.g. the phonological loop), dialogic inner speech involves 
an internal “conversation” or “dialogue” between different perspectives held by oneself, thus 
affording cognitive flexibility and executive control. In other words, monologic inner speech can 
be described as ‘for oneself,’ whereas dialogic inner speech can be described as ‘with oneself’ 
(Williams et al., 2012). Consistent with Vygotsky’s (1987) theory of a developmental 
internalization of language, and because ASD involves deficits engaging in dialogue with others, 
people with ASD may also have deficits “engaging in dialogue with themselves.” Because ToM 
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inherently involves simultaneous representation of multiple perspectives, ToM likely involves 
dialogic inner speech. Deficits in dialogic inner speech may therefore contribute to the ToM 
deficits seen in ASD. 
Despite delays in ToM development, many children with ASD ultimately pass belief-
reasoning tasks. Therefore, although people with ASD have more difficulty with ToM than their 
peers, they do not categorically lack theory of mind. Instead, it appears that the ability to reason 
about others’ minds is a gradated skill that varies in different contexts and under different 
constraints. For example, people with ASD tend to demonstrate stronger ToM abilities in 
experimental settings as compared to naturalistic settings (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Given 
that people with ASD, particularly those with intact cognitive skills, are eventually able to 
demonstrate ToM, though with varying efficiency (Channon, Charman, Heap, Crawford, & Rios, 
2001; Kaland, Callesen, Møller-Nielsen, Mortensen, & Smith, 2008), we sought to explore the 
role of inner speech in thinking about the minds of others in individuals with high-functioning 
ASD. In the present study, we examined the role of inner speech in ToM (using a false belief 
task) in adolescents with ASD.  
 Current study. Given evidence of global ToM deficits in ASD, and given evidence of 
inner speech deficits in people with ASD (Wallace et al., 2009; Whitehouse et al., 2006; 
Williams et al., 2012), we hypothesized that participants with ASD verbally mediate ToM less 
than their TD peers. To test this hypothesis, in Study 1, we examined the degree to which a 
verbal load dual task, which suppresses inner speech, interfered with false belief task 
performance in adolescents with high-functioning ASD as compared to TD adolescents. 
Participants with ASD and TD completed true and false belief tasks while engaging in a verbal 
interference dual task, designed to suppress inner speech, and a spatial load dual task, designed 
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to leave inner speech intact. We measured task performance in terms of accuracy. We also 
measured reaction time (RT) for each trial, as we anticipated that this metric might be more 
sensitive to group differences. We anticipated that verbal mediation would be reflected in a 
greater performance decrement (reduced accuracy or greater RT) under verbal load as compared 
to spatial load. Therefore, we predicted a performance decrement for TD participants on false 
belief trials under verbal load, but an absence of this task by condition interaction in the ASD 
group. 
We were also interested in exploring the relationship between ToM, external language 
skills, and EF. Considering evidence that language is integral to false belief in TD (Milligan et 
al., 2007) but appears to be underutilized during mediation of cognitive tasks among people with 
ASD, we predicted a significant correlation between language skills and false belief performance 
among TD participants, but a minimal correlation between language skills and false belief 
performance among ASD participants. Moreover, given studies suggesting a relationship 
between false belief and inhibitory control (Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie, Friedman, & 
German, 2004) as well as executive functions more generally (Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009), 
we anticipated that direct and indirect measures of inhibitory control and general executive 
functions EF scores would correlate with false belief performance for all participants. 
In Study 2, we collected data to test the comparability of cognitive load imposed by the 
verbal load versus spatial load task in order to confirm that any load-driven performance 
differences in Study 1 were due to the verbal versus spatial nature of the dual tasks rather than 
task demands more generally. 
Study 1: Belief-Reasoning Dual Task 
Methods 
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 Participants. Participants were 32 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18 with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD; n = 15) or typical development (TD; n = 17). The groups did not differ 
on gender, age, full scale IQ (FSIQ), or general language ability. There were significant group 
differences, however, in both verbal IQ (VIQ) and nonverbal IQ (NVIQ): the TD group VIQ was 
1 SD higher than the ASD group, and the ASD group NVIQ was 1 SD higher than the TD group. 
Participant characterization data are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Typically Developing (TD) 
groups. 
 
 ASD TD F/𝜒2 p 
n  15 17   
Sex (M:F) 13:2 14:3 𝜒2 = 0.11 0.74 
Age 14.1 (1.6) 
9.0-16.4 
14.4 (1.9) 
9.9-15.6 
0.25 0.62 
 12-18 12-17   
FSIQ 102.4 (9.7) 103.4 (8.6) 0.09 0.77 
 85-121 88-124   
VIQ  9.7 (2.7) 
81-133 
11.5 (2.0) 
99-136 
4.89 0.04 
 5-13 9-16   
NVIQ  11.2 (2.4) 
78-147 
9.5 (1.9) 
89-139 
4.68 0.04 
 7-15 6-13   
SCQ (Raw score) 27.2 (13.4) 2.4 (2.1) 56.72 0.001 
 16-59 0-7   
CELF Core Lang 108.6 (10.3) 115.0 (9.7) 3.12 0.09 
 93-123 93-129   
D-KEFS C-W Inhib 10.3 (1.4) 11.8 (2.6) 3.89 0.06 
 8-13 5-16   
BRIEF GEC 62.2 (7.9) 48.5 (8.0) 22.29 0.001 
 44-78 38-61   
Table data are reported as mean (SD), range. All measures are given as standard scores, unless 
otherwise noted. FSIQ = Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition, Full Scale IQ; VIQ = 
Stanford-Binet Verbal IQ; NVIQ = Stanford-Binet Nonverbal IQ; SCQ = Social Communication 
Questionnaire; CELF = Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; D-KEFS = Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System; BRIEF = Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function. 
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All participants had full-scale IQ scores in the average range (SS > 85) as measured by 
the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition, abbreviated (Roid, 2003). Inclusion criteria 
for each group were as follows: 
ASD group. Participants met diagnostic criteria based on DSM-IV-TR criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), confirmed using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 2002), the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003), and clinical judgment. All participants had an ADOS composite 
score at or above the clinical cutoff of 7 and an SCQ score at or above the clinical cutoff of 15.  
TD group. Participants in the TD group did not meet criteria for ASD based on clinical 
judgment or the SCQ. Participants had no first-degree relatives with an ASD diagnosis. In order 
to avoid a hyper-normative group, however, TD children were not excluded for other learning or 
psychiatric disorders. 
Exclusion criteria. Participants were excluded from all groups if they exhibited 
symptoms of major psychopathology that would impede study participation, a history of 
traumatic brain injury with loss of consciousness, or other neurologic disorders or known genetic 
syndromes.  
Participants were part of a larger study on social cognition in ASD. All procedures were 
approved by University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board. Parents provided written 
assent and participants provided written assent for study participation; participants received 
financial remuneration. 
 Measures. Participants completed a comprehensive assessment of autism symptoms, 
verbal IQ, nonverbal IQ, working memory, and executive functions. ASD diagnosis was 
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confirmed for the ASD group using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord 
et al., 2002), the “gold-standard” measure for assessing and diagnosing autism spectrum 
disorder. Autism symptom severity was measured using the Social Communication 
Questionnaire, Lifetime Version (SCQ; Rutter et al., 2003), a parent-report measure of lifespan 
autism symptoms. 
 FSIQ was measured using the Stanford-Binet (Roid, 2003), with a Vocabulary (verbal 
routing) subtest to assess verbal IQ (VIQ), and Nonverbal Reasoning (nonverbal routing) subtest 
to assess nonverbal IQ (NVIQ). General language ability was measured using the Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003) Core Language 
composite index. 
 To measure EF, participants completed the Color-Word Interference: Inhibition subtest 
from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), 
which measures inhibitory control. Parents completed the Behavior Rating Inventory of 
Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000), a parent-report measure 
of executive functions, which generates several specific domain scores as well as a Global 
Executive Composite index, with higher values indicating greater executive dysfunction. 
 Experimental task. The experimental belief-reasoning dual task was designed to test false 
belief comprehension under dual task conditions. Similar to the task described in Newton and de 
Villiers (2007), this task utilized a location-change false belief task paradigm. Unlike the Newton 
and de Villiers (2007) task, which used a single trial (between-subjects design), the current task 
used multiple trials (within-between-subjects design).  
Design. Each participant completed eight trials in total, with two trials per belief/load 
combination (false/verbal; false/spatial; true/verbal; true/spatial). Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of four orders (all participants completed the same trials). Trial presentation 
order was pseudorandom and counterbalanced by group, with the first trial type balanced across 
groups to permit comparison of the first trial response only. Responses were measured via button 
press; performance was recorded for accuracy (correct or incorrect) and response RT (time from 
stimulus onset to button press). 
 Primary belief-reasoning task. The belief-reasoning task comprised eight one-minute 
live-action video trials. In each trial, a young woman (“Annie”) hides an apple in Location A, 
after which a character dressed in a distinctive blue coverall (the Custodian) moves the apple to 
Location B. In true belief trials, Annie watches while her apple is moved; in false belief trials, 
Annie leaves the room and does not see the final location of the apple. Each trial ends with two 
images: a) Annie searching in Location A (where she originally left her apple) and b) Annie 
searching Location B (where the Custodian moved the apple). For true belief trials, Location B 
was correct; for false belief trials, Location A was correct. Participants selected the “correct 
ending” by pressing a key with their right or left index fingers to select the image on the 
corresponding side. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible while being as 
accurate as possible. Photo location was counterbalanced by trial. All videos used the same two 
actors and target object (apple), but depicted four different rooms and hiding locations. See 
Figure 2 for images from a sample false belief trial.
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 Secondary load task. The belief-reasoning videos were accompanied by a 1-second 
metronome (a computer recording of a brief “click” sound). Participants performed one of two 
secondary tasks in time to the metronome: in the verbal load condition (four trials), participants 
recited the days of the week at a rate of one word per second; in the spatial load condition (four 
trials), participants tapped with the left hand in a sequence of four blocks (in a figure eight 
configuration) at a rate of one tap per second.  
 Materials. The task was programmed and run using SuperLab 5 software. The 
experiment was conducted on a 13” MacBook Pro. Color-coded tactile stickers were placed on 
the “o” and “p” keyboard keys to facilitate accurate responding. The four blocks used for the 
spatial tapping task were 1.5 cubic inches and were affixed to a foam board in a 4 by 6 inch 
rectangular configuration.  
 Procedure. Testing was conducted either at the participant’s home or at the 
University of Connecticut. Participation involved two sessions each lasting three hours. 
Participants completed the experimental task as well as several standardized measures 
(detailed in the Measures section). As part of a larger study, participants completed 
several additional standardized tasks and experimental measures not discussed here. 
Prior to beginning the experimental task, participants completed extensive task training. 
First, participants received instructions on the verbal and spatial load tasks and practiced each of 
these tasks in time to the metronome until they were comfortable. Participants also practiced 
selecting images on the screen using the keyboard response buttons. No participant had difficulty 
understanding or carrying out these tasks. 
 To become familiar and comfortable with study procedures, participants completed two 
practice trials: they first watched a video of a causal event (a person’s hand spilling a glass of 
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milk, followed by an image of a full glass and an image of an empty glass) while saying days of 
the week (verbal load) or tapping the blocks (spatial load), and then selected one of the two 
images using the response buttons.  No participants had difficulty understanding the task or 
selecting the correct response for the training trials.  
 Participants were next instructed on the belief-reasoning task. They viewed a series of 
images while the experimenter recited the following script: 
“This story is about a girl named Annie. This is Annie. [Cartoon picture of 
Annie.] Today, Annie brought her favorite snack to school – a green apple. 
[Picture of apple.] Annie is looking for a safe place to hide her apple until lunch. 
But there’s a problem: whenever Annie hides her apple, the Custodian moves it! 
[Cartoon picture of Custodian.] Sometimes, Annie is in the room when the 
Custodian moves her apple, but sometimes she’s not. You will see two photos on 
the screen that show two possible endings to the story. Your job is to pick the 
ending that shows where Annie thinks her apple is.” 
 
Participants were then tested for task comprehension prior to starting the experiment; testing did 
not proceed until the participant demonstrated comprehension of the task. All participants were 
able to achieve task comprehension prior to beginning the task. 
 Participants then completed the eight experimental trials. At the end of each trial, 
participants responded by pressing the “o” key with the right index finger or the “p” key with the 
right middle finger. 
Results 
 Between-subjects independent variables included group (ASD, TD) and task order (1, 2, 
3, 4). Within-subjects independent variables included belief (true, false) and load (verbal, 
spatial). Dependent variables included task accuracy and reaction time (RT). Accuracy data was 
calculated as number of correct trials divided by total number of trials multiplied by 100, 
yielding a percent accuracy score. 
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 Preliminary Analyses. Dependent variables (accuracy and RT) were checked for outliers 
and missing data. Consistent with prior studies, RTs faster than 100 ms (see Whelan, 2010) and 
outlier RTs, defined as 2.5 SD above or below the mean (see Balota & Spieler, 1999) were 
removed from the data; 9 trials were removed1.   
Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were examined. Accuracy data 
met the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Levene statistic p = .65), but were non-normally 
distributed with negative skew and negative kurtosis (Shapiro-Wilk ps < .05); these data could 
not be normalized using standard transformations. As a result, main and interaction effects on 
accuracy were first examined using a three-way repeated-measures mixed-model ANOVA 
(group x load x belief). Post-hoc nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests; Mann-
Whitney U tests) were used to explore any significant main or interaction effects. 
RT data were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk ps > .60) but violated the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance between groups (Levene statistic p < .05); a logarithmic transformation 
was applied to the data before formal analyses were performed, after which the assumption was 
met. A three-way repeated-measures mixed-model ANOVA (group x load x belief) tested for 
main and interaction effects. Post-hoc t-tests probed load-by-belief group differences. 
Effect sizes were calculated with partial eta squared (ηp2), which describes the proportion 
of variance attributable to a given effect after partialling out non-error sources of variance 
(Cohen, 1988). Although the groups differed in VIQ, because VIQ is inherently related to the 
independent variable (diagnostic group), it was not included as a covariate (see Dennis et al., 
2009).  
                                                
1 After outliers were removed, overall RTs were calculated for each participant as the mean of the remaining trials. 
2 Geometric mean (GM) is the back-transformed value of the log-of a set of numbers, using the product of their 
values. 
3 Based on piloting of the task, these instructions were necessary for participants to establish a baseline 
understanding of the task. 
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To examine within-group correlations, Pearson correlations were used (conventions for 
effect size, r: small = .10; medium = .30; large = .50). When assumptions of normality were 
violated (for RT data), Kendall’s 𝜏 nonparametric analyses were conducted. 
 Order effects: Accuracy. Order effects were examined independently and in relation to 
the other variables of interest: group, load, and belief. There were no main effects of order, 
F(3,24) = .35, p = .79, ηp2 = .04., and no two-way interactions (order x group, order x load, or 
order x belief), all ps > .27. However, there was a significant three-way interaction of order x 
group x load, F(3,24) = 7.03, p < .01, ηp2 = .47 (Figure 3). Post-hoc analyses revealed three-way 
interactions between orders 1 and 2, F(1,12) = 14.6, p < .01, ηp2 = .53. This three-way interaction 
was driven by a two-way load x group interaction, showing that, within order 1 (in which spatial 
trials were 2, 4, 6, and 8, and verbal trials were 1, 3, 5, and 7), the difference between spatial load 
and verbal load among TD participants (among whom accuracy was numerically but not 
statistically greater under spatial load, p = .18) was significantly different than the difference 
between spatial load and verbal load among ASD participants (among whom accuracy was 
numerically but not statistically greater under verbal load, p = .21), F(1,12) = 9.80, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.62. Between order 1 and 2 (in which spatial trials were 2, 4, 6, and 8, and verbal trials were 1, 3, 
5, and 7), no other two-way interactions or main effects were significant, all ps > .16. The post-
hoc analyses also revealed a significant three-way interaction of order x group x load between 
orders 1 and 4 (in which spatial trials were 2, 4, 7, and 8, and verbal trials were 1, 3, 5, and 6), 
F(1,12) = 13.4, p < .01, ηp2 = .55. Between orders 1 and 4, there was also a two-way group x 
order interaction within verbal trials, F(1,12) = 8.78, p < .05, ηp2 = .44, with TD participants in 
order 4 being more accurate than ASD participants in that order, F(1,12) = 9.55, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.66. There were no four-way interaction effects, all ps > .05. Because the order effects in orders 
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1, 2, and 4 were nonsystematic (e.g. there were no clearly aberrant accuracy profiles; accuracy in 
order 3 did not differ from the other order conditions), all ps > .20, we believe these results 
reflect idiosyncratic accuracy data. Moreover, dividing the sample by order would yield only 
four participants per cell, reducing power and increasing the risk of Type II errors. All data were 
therefore collapsed across order in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Accuracy data for order effects. Top figure displays ASD data; bottom figure displays 
TD data. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
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 Order effects: RT. There was no main effect of order, F(3,28) = .18, p = .08, ηp2 = .25. 
There was a significant interaction of order x belief, F(3,28) = 3.76, p < .05, ηp2 = .32 (Figure 4). 
Post-hoc analyses revealed an order x belief interaction for orders 1 and 3, F(1,14) = 5.43, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .28: in order 1 (in which true belief trials were 1, 4, 7, and 8, and false belief trials were 
2, 3, 5, and 6), participants were faster on false belief trials as compared to true belief trials, 
F(1,7) = 8.58, p < .05, ηp2 = .55. The difference for false versus true belief trials was not 
significant in order 3, F(1,7) = 1.10, p = .33, ηp2 = .14. There were no additional two-way, three-
way, or four-way interactions, all ps > .37. Because these order effects did not involve diagnostic 
group differences, and because orders 2 and 4 did not differ from orders 1 and 3, these results 
reflect nonsystematic findings. All orders were therefore collapsed in subsequent analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. RT data for order effects. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
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(TD; ASD), load (verbal; spatial), and belief (false; true) using a three-way mixed-model 
ANOVA (group x load x belief).  
Overall, task accuracy was high: mean accuracy was 81%, with a range of 50% to 100%; 
chance performance was 50%. Analyses revealed no main effect of group, F(1,30) = .96, p = .34, 
ηp2 = .03: overall accuracy rates were comparable for participants with ASD (M = 77.5%; SD = 
18.4) and TD (M = 83.8%; SD = 18.1). Collapsing across groups, Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests 
revealed no main effect of belief type, z = -1.07, p = .28. There was, however, a main effect of 
load, such that across groups, participants were significantly less accurate under verbal load (Md 
= 75%; SD = 22) than under spatial load (Md = 100%; SD = 19), z = -1.98, p < .05, with a small 
to medium effect (r = .25)  
There was no interaction between group and belief, F(1,30) = .17, p = .69, ηp2 = .01. 
Importantly, accuracy on false belief trials specifically was equivalent between the ASD group 
(M = 80%; SD = 27) and TD group (M = 90%; SD = 24). There was no interaction between 
group and load, F(1,30) = .31, p = .58, ηp2 = .01, and there was no was group x load x belief 
interaction, F(1,30) = 1.09, p = .31, ηp2 = .04. 
The main effect of load was explored further by examining the load x belief interaction: 
this interaction was not significant, F(1,30) = .34, p = .56, ηp2 = .01. These findings suggest that, 
though participants in both groups were less accurate under verbal load, this verbal interference 
effect was not specific to false-belief performance. Rather, participants experienced verbal 
interference across both true and false belief trials. These results suggest that task accuracy was 
generally high, though not at ceiling, with no group differences, and that verbal load had a 
greater impact on task performance than spatial load for both diagnostic groups, regardless of 
trial type. Accuracy data are presented in Table 2 and Figure 5. 
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Table 2. Percent accuracy by diagnostic group, load, and belief 
 
  TD  ASD  
  M SD; Range M SD; Range 
Verbal Load     
 False Belief 88  (28) 77  (32) 
   0-100  0-100 
 True Belief 70  (43) 73  (37) 
   0-100  0-100 
Spatial Load     
 False Belief 91  (19) 83  (30) 
   50-100  0-100 
 True Belief 85  (34) 77  (32) 
   0-100  0-100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean percent accuracy as a function of belief condition and load condition for ASD 
and TD participants. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. 
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 Reaction time. Because implicit, on-line responses may be more sensitive to individual 
differences, we examined RT as a second metric of task performance. We conducted a second 
repeated-measures mixed-model ANOVA (group x load x belief), using log-transformed RT as 
the dependent variable.  
The overall geometric mean (GM)2 RT was 1567 ms, with a range of 489 to 5370 ms. 
There was a significant main effect of group on RT, F(1,30) = 10.45, p < .005, ηp2 = .26, such 
that ASD participants (GM = 1922 ms; 95% CI [1547, 2388]) were significantly slower than TD 
participants (GM = 1309 ms; 95% CI [1147, 1493]). In order to examine factors driving this 
group difference, we tested whether group interacted with load and belief conditions. None of 
these interactions were significant, all ps > .10. These findings suggest that ASD participants 
responded more slowly in general, and that this slower RT was not driven by interference load or 
trial type. 
There was no main effect of load, F(1,30) = .34, p = .56, ηp2 = .01, or belief, F(1,30) = 
.34, p = .56, ηp2 = .01, and no load x belief interaction, F(1,30) = .34, p = .56, ηp2 = .01, 
suggesting that neither load, nor trial type, nor their interaction affected RT. RT data are 
presented in Table 3 and Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Geometric mean (GM) is the back-transformed value of the log-of a set of numbers, using the product of their 
values. 
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Table 3. Reaction time (ms) by diagnostic group, load, and belief 
 
  TD  ASD  
  GM 95% CI; Range GM 95% CI; Range 
Verbal Load     
 False Belief 1251 [1056, 1483] 1930  [1417, 2629] 
   489-2089  603-5370 
 True Belief 1363  [1162, 1599] 1638  [1310, 2047] 
   871-2455  832-2752 
Spatial Load     
 False Belief 1241  [1085, 1419] 1902 [1577, 2294] 
   832-2042  933-3477 
 True Belief 1310  [1121, 1532] 2029  [1526, 2635] 
   661-2399  871-4467 
Table reports geometric means, followed by 95% CIs, followed by ranges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Geometric mean RT as a function of belief condition and load condition for ASD and 
TD participants. Error bars represent standard error of the geometric means. Asterisks indicate 
significant differences between conditions, p < .005. 
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 Trial 1 accuracy and RT. Between-subjects ANOVAs were used to examine trial 1 
accuracy and RT for trial condition (belief/load) by group. There were no main or interaction 
effects of trial condition by group on trial 1 accuracy or RT, all ps > .10. It is important to note 
that, given the between-subjects analyses necessary for examining trial 1 differences, however, 
each cell contained only 4 participants. Results should therefore be interpreted with caution due 
to the increased risk of Type II errors.  
 Correlational analyses: language ability. Because verbal load did not specifically 
interfere with false belief, we looked for a direct relationship between language and belief 
reasoning by examining language ability correlates of performance on false belief versus true 
belief trials. Within each diagnostic group, we examined correlations between CELF Core 
Language, VIQ, and NVIQ scores and false belief RT, as well as true belief RT. Due to 
violations of assumptions of normality, as well as high frequency of tied ranks within the data, 
we used nonparametric analyses. Data are presented in Table 4 and Figure 7. 
There was no significant correlation between CELF Core Language and false or true 
belief RT within either group, all ps > .20. Within the ASD group, however, VIQ correlated with 
RT for false belief trials, r𝜏(13) = -.40, p < .05, but not true belief trials, r𝜏(13) = -.14, p = .48, 
such that, among ASD participants, higher VIQ was associated with faster RT for false belief 
trials. Within the TD group, there was no relationship between false belief trials, r𝜏(15) = .01, or 
true belief trials, r𝜏(15) = -.16, ps > .41. In order to examine whether this relationship between 
RT and VIQ within the ASD group was specific to verbal ability, we also examined the 
relationship between NVIQ and false belief RT; there was no correlation within the ASD group, 
r𝜏(13) = .08, p = .69, or the TD group, r𝜏(15) = .02, ps > .69. These findings suggest that, within 
the ASD group, VIQ predicted faster processing of false belief trials above and beyond more 
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general task demands. Within the TD group, however, VIQ was not associated with speed of 
false belief processing. Data are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Correlation table of CELF, VIQ, and NVIQ versus false belief RT, and true belief RT 
within ASD and TD groups. Data are reported as Kendall’s 𝜏 values. 
 
 ASD  
  False Belief RT True Belief RT 
CELF Core Lang. -.22 -.05 
VIQ -.40* -.14 
NVIQ .08 -.04 
 TD  
 False Belief RT True Belief RT 
CELF Core Lang. .00 -.08 
VIQ .01 -.16 
NVIQ .02 .16 
* p < .05 
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Figure 7. Scatterplots and regression lines of VIQ by True Belief RT (top figure) and by False 
Belief RT (bottom figure) by diagnostic group. 
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Correlational analyses: executive functions. Given evidence suggesting that executive 
functions, particularly inhibitory control, are associated with false belief task performance, we 
examined the relationship between general EF as well as inhibitory control and belief reasoning 
within each group. Within each group, we examined correlations between BRIEF General 
Executive Composite (for which lower scores indicate stronger EF) and D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Inhibition performance (for which higher scores indicate stronger EF) versus false 
belief and true belief RT. Due to violations of assumptions of normality and high frequency of 
tied ranks within the data we again used nonparametric analyses. There were no significant 
correlations for either the BRIEF GEC or D-KEFS Color-Word Inhibition with false or true 
belief RT within either group, all ps > .05. Data are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Correlation table of D-KEFS Color-Word Interference and BRIEF versus false belief 
RT, and true belief RT within ASD and TD groups. Data are reported as Kendall’s 𝜏 values. 
 
 ASD  
  False Belief RT True Belief RT 
D-KEFS C-W Inhib. .03 .09 
BRIEF GEC -.01 .03 
 TD  
 False Belief RT True Belief RT 
D-KEFS C-W Inhib. .21 .38 
BRIEF GEC .19 .22 
* p < .05 
 
 
Study 1 Summary 
 We used an experimental dual task paradigm in which participants completed false and 
true belief tasks while engaging in a verbal load task (to suppress inner speech), or a spatial load 
task (designed to preserve inner speech). We predicted that verbal load would interfere with false 
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belief, and that language abilities would be associated with more efficient false belief processing, 
in the TD group but not the ASD group. There was no general false belief deficit in this highly 
verbal group of youth with ASD for false belief task performance. Contrary to our hypotheses, 
we found no verbal load interference of the false belief task in either the ASD or the TD group. 
We also predicted that EF would be associated with false belief processing within both groups. 
We found, however, no evidence to support this relationship within either group. We did find 
that, regardless of diagnostic group, participants were generally less accurate on the belief-
reasoning task during the verbal load task as compared to spatial load task. To rule out the 
possibility that this performance difference reflects greater difficulty of the verbal load task as 
compared to the spatial load task, based on an approach used in Hegarty, Shah, and Miyake 
(2000), we compared load task performance using a secondary (dual-task) methodology. 
Study 2: Perceptual Matching Dual Task 
To compare the difficulty of the verbal versus spatial interference tasks, we conducted a 
second study utilizing a Perceptual Matching task, which involved low-level visual scanning and 
has been shown to minimally involve verbal mediation and central executive functions (Hegarty 
et al., 2000). 
Methods 
 Participants. Participants were 32 undergraduates at the University of Connecticut who 
participated for course credit. All participants were native English speakers and had no 
significant visual or auditory impairments that would impede study participation. This study was 
approved by the University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board. Participants provided 
written consent for study participation. 
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 Perceptual matching dual task. The primary task was a “perceptual matching task,” 
adapted from a task used in Hegarty et al. (2000), which required primarily visual scanning to 
match line drawings. Given that the aim of this secondary study was to test the difficulty of the 
two dual tasks used in Study 1, this primary task was selected to draw on low-level cognitive 
functions (e.g., attention) but place minimal demands on executive functions and require 
minimal verbal mediation. The task was adapted from the Identical Pictures Test in the Kit of 
Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). 
In this task, participants were instructed to match a target figure (on the left side of the 
horizontal line; Figure 7) to one of four figures on the right as quickly and as accurately as 
possible, by pressing one of four buttons corresponding with the four fingers of the right hand. 
There were 25 randomized trials in each block; all trials were comprised of different line 
drawings. Responses were recorded for accuracy and RT. Responses were measured by button 
press; performance was recorded for accuracy (correct or incorrect) and reaction time (RT; as 
measured as time from onset of stimulus presentation to button press). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Example trial from the Perceptual Matching Task. 
 
 
 Secondary load task. The secondary task was the same as in Experiment 1: while 
completing the perceptual matching (primary) task, participants performed a dual task (imposing 
a verbal load by reciting days of the week, or a spatial load by tapping a sequence of four blocks 
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with the left hand. Unlike in Experiment 1, participants in this experiment performed each dual 
task continually throughout the 25 trials of each block. 
 Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two counterbalanced orders. In 
both orders, participants completed two blocks of 25 primary task trials for a total of 50 trials: 
the 25 trials within each block were randomized. In order 1, participants first completed the 
verbal load trials, followed by the spatial load trials; this was reversed in order 2. 
 Materials. The task was programmed using SuperLab 5. The experiment was conducted 
on a 21.5-inch iMac. Responses were given using a Cedrus RB-740 response pad. The four 
blocks used for the spatial load (tapping) task were affixed to a foam board in a 4 by 6 inch 
rectangular configuration.  
 Procedure. The experiment was conducted in a quiet lab room at the University of 
Connecticut and lasted 20-25 minutes. Before beginning the task, participants first completed a 
brief training. The secondary task training was identical to that presented in the belief reasoning 
experiment: participants received instructions for the verbal and spatial load tasks and practiced 
them in time to a metronome until they were comfortable. They also practiced pressing the four 
buttons with the right hand that corresponded to the four possible responses. Before starting the 
experiment, the participants completed several practice trials of the perceptual matching task, 
first without a secondary load task and then with each load task. They then completed the two 
blocks of 25 experimental trials. 
Results 
Dependent variables were task accuracy and reaction time (RT). Accuracy data was 
calculated as number of correct trials divided by total number of trials multiplied by 100, 
yielding a percent accuracy score.  
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 Preliminary Analyses. Dependent variables (accuracy and RT) were checked for outliers 
and missing data. As in Study 1, outlier RTs, defined as 2.5 SD above or below the mean, and 
RTs faster than 100 ms were removed from the data. Assumptions of normality and homogeneity 
of variance were examined. 
Accuracy data were non-normally distributed with negative skew (Shapiro Wilk p < .05); 
a reflected logarithmic transformation was applied before formal analyses were performed. RT 
data were non-normally distributed with positive skew and positive kurtosis (Shapiro-Wilk ps < 
.05); a logarithmic transformation was applied. After transformation, both measures met 
statistical assumptions. Two-way repeated-measures mixed-model ANOVAs (load x order) 
tested for main and interaction effects of both Accuracy and RT data. Post-hoc t-tests were used 
to examine load-by-order interactions. Effect size was calculated with partial eta squared (ηp2).  
 Accuracy. We examined effects of load (verbal, spatial) and order (1, 2) using a two-way 
mixed-model ANOVA, using reflected-log-transformed percent accuracy as our dependent 
variable, with effect of load condition on accuracy as our primary contrast of interest.  
The overall (geometric) mean task accuracy was 90%, with a range of 68% to 100%; 
chance performance was 25%. Analyses revealed no main effect of load, F(1,30) = 2.59, p = .19, 
ηp2 = .08, or order, F(1,30) = 1.84, p = .19, ηp2 = .06, and no load and order interaction, F(1,30) = 
.78, p = .38, ηp2 = .03, suggesting that neither the load task nor the task order affected accuracy. 
 Reaction time. We next examined effects of load and order on log-transformed RT, again 
using a two-way mixed-model ANOVA. The effect of load condition on RT was the primary 
contrast of interest. 
The overall (geometric) mean RT was 1824 ms. Analyses revealed a significant main 
effect of load, F(1,30) = 6.48, p < .05, ηp2 = .18, where participants had significantly slower RTs 
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under spatial load (GM = 1880; 95% CI [1734, 2038]) than under verbal load (GM = 1759; 95% 
CI [1635, 1892]). There was also a load x order interaction, F(1,30) = 10.92, p < .005, ηp2 = .27; 
a post-hoc paired-samples t-tests revealed that only participants in order 2 (who completed 
spatial load trials first) were slower under spatial load as compared to verbal load, t(31) = -4.23, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = .72. There was no difference in RT for verbal load trials, t(30) = .21, p = 
.84, Cohen’s d = .08.  Given that participants in order 2 completed the spatial block first and the 
verbal block second, and that participants who completed the spatial block first were slower on 
that block, these findings suggest a benefit from practice effects for spatial load trials only. 
Study 2 Summary 
 Results indicate that accuracy in a low-level, non-verbally-mediated task did not differ 
for verbal and spatial load tasks, suggesting that these interference tasks did not differentially 
interfere with accuracy in Study 1. Results did reveal, however, that RT on the Perceptual 
Matching task did differ for verbal versus spatial interference, such that participants were slower 
to respond during the spatial interference task, particularly when they encountered that task first.  
This suggests an effect of practice. These data also indicate that slower RT on the Study 1 Belief-
Reasoning task under verbal load was not due to it being more demanding. In fact, this study 
suggests that the verbal interference task was less taxing of general cognitive and attention 
functions than the spatial load task. 
Discussion 
 The current study examined the relationship between language and ToM in adolescents 
with ASD and TD. To investigate whether or not verbal load interfered with belief reasoning, 
participants completed an experimental dual task paradigm in which they completed false belief 
tasks while engaging in a verbal load task, designed to suppress inner speech, and a spatial load 
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task. Given evidence that ToM is verbally mediated in TD, and that people with ASD rely less 
on verbal mediation in general, we predicted that verbal load would interfere with false belief in 
the TD group but not the ASD group. We also examined predictors of false belief by testing 
associations between false belief processing (as measured by RT on false belief trials) and 
language ability (as measured by CELF Core Language and VIQ as compared to NIVQ) within 
each group, as well as inhibitory control (as measured by D-KEFS Color-Word Interference), 
and general executive functions (as measured by the BRIEF Global Executive Composite). 
Lastly, to compare the cognitive load imposed by a verbal versus a spatial dual task, a second 
study examined performance in a non verbally-mediated (picture matching) task under verbal 
versus spatial loads. This allowed us to test whether either load was more cognitively 
demanding, or whether the effects of verbal load were specific to the belief-reasoning task. 
 Our findings revealed comparable task accuracy between groups, for both false belief and 
true belief trials, and no significant interactions within or between groups for load task or belief 
status. Findings indicated a main effect of group on RT, such that ASD participants were slower 
overall than their TD counterparts. There were no significant between-group interaction effects, 
and no effects of load task or belief status. Thus, contrary to our hypothesis, there was no 
performance decrement (in terms of accuracy or RT) on false belief trials under verbal load for 
either group. Regarding correlational analyses, there were no associations between false belief 
RT and CELF Core Language scores within either group. There was an association between false 
belief RT and VIQ for the ASD but not TD group; in contrast, false belief and NVIQ were 
uncorrelated. There were no correlations between EF measures and false belief RT within either 
group.  
 Below, we review these findings in light of broader issues regarding ToM as a construct, 
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and discuss criticisms regarding the false belief task as a metric of ToM. We also explore the 
finding of an association between language false belief performance within the ASD group in the 
context of a two-systems account of ToM.  
 False belief performance in ASD. In the current study, TD and ASD participants 
demonstrated comparably strong performance on false belief tasks, with accuracy rates of 88% 
and 80% respectively. Thus, ASD participants in our study showed no generalized deficit in false 
belief task performance. This finding contradicts literature suggesting broad deficits in ToM in 
people ASD. Importantly, however, the verbal ages among our ASD participants in our study 
were well beyond the verbal age associated with successful false belief task performance 
(Wellman, 1990). The current results provide compelling evidence that, contrary to common 
beliefs, ASD individuals with intact language skills have globally intact false belief reasoning. 
As discussed below, however, it is important to note that false belief tasks represent only one 
index of ToM. 
 Verbal interference of false belief. Overall, results from the belief-reasoning dual task 
were inconsistent with our hypothesis. Contrary to predictions, we found no evidence that verbal 
load interfered with false belief per se in either the ASD group or the TD group. Participants 
under verbal load were no less accurate for false belief than for true belief trials, nor were there 
RT differences. In fact, accuracy rates on false belief trials under verbal load were 77% and 88% 
for ASD and TD groups, respectively. These findings are inconsistent with Newton and de 
Villiers (2007), in which verbal loads disrupted false belief task performance (42% correct) 
while sparing true belief performance (91% correct). 
 Given their findings, Newton and de Villiers (2007) concluded that inner speech is 
required for false belief task performance. If so, how might we explain the success of 
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participants in the current task, who presumably had little access to inner speech under verbal 
load? There are several possibilities. 
 First, the experimental design of the current study differed from that of Newton and de 
Villiers (2007) in several crucial ways. While Newton and de Villiers (2007) used a between-
subjects design (i.e., every participant completed only one trial), we used a within-subjects 
design (i.e., every participant completed two true belief and two false belief trials under both 
load conditions); this was a necessary design feature in a study including a clinical population, 
where sample sizes are necessarily smaller. The absence in the current study of false belief-
specific verbal interference may reflect, in part, the fact that participants completed multiple 
belief trials in succession. Although each trial was set in a different room with a different hiding 
place for Annie’s apple, there was only one substantive manipulation: whether or not Annie was 
in the room when the Custodian moved the apple from one location to another. Based on 
subjective observations as well as participant debriefing after the task, we suspect that most 
participants were able to recognize this manipulation and “get into set,” such that they were able 
to circumvent the need to verbally mediate conflicting belief representations repeatedly for each 
trial. For example, during trials in which Annie left the room (which was the signature 
manipulation of false belief trials), many participants (both ASD and TD) reported that they 
simply “held in mind” the original apple location and “tuned out” the location change, knowing 
that the original location would always be the correct answer when Annie left the room. This 
heuristic allowed participants to bypass verbally mediated false belief reasoning, thus 
minimizing the impact of verbal interference on task performance. 
 Moreover, in Newton and de Villiers (2007), it is unclear what, if any, task instructions 
were provided to participants prior to beginning the task. The current experiment, on the other 
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hand, provided verbal and written task explanations to participants, including specific mention of 
Annie either being in the room or not, and that the goal was to pick the ending “where Annie 
thinks her apple is.”3 It is likely that these explicit instructions effectively helped participants 
anticipate and verbally reason about belief representations prior to beginning the task at all, 
potentially minimizing their reliance on inner speech. 
 The verbal and spatial interference stimuli also differed between studies. In the current 
experiment, participants tapped a sequence of blocks or said a sequence of words, in time to a 
metronome. In Newton and de Villiers (2007), however, participants were required to either 
perform brief “call and response” tapping sequences or verbally echo a complex verbal narrative 
in real time.4 It is possible that the attentional and cognitive demands of the interference tasks, 
particularly the verbal interference tasks, differed greatly between studies. Finally, Newton and 
de Villiers’s (2007) task included two location changes (e.g., location A to B to C), whereas the 
current task only included one location change (e.g., location A to B). The need for participants 
to track the object location among three locations in Newton and de Villiers (2007) likely 
increased the executive load (e.g., attention and working memory) of their task. Together, these 
task differences may help to account for the discrepant findings of the current study and those of 
Newton and de Villiers (2007). 
 These discrepant findings highlight inconsistencies in the meaning and use of the concept 
of representational false belief. All participants in both studies likely possessed the capacity to 
represent false belief.5 In Newton and de Villiers (2007), while participants’ capacity for false 
                                                
3 Based on piloting of the task, these instructions were necessary for participants to establish a baseline 
understanding of the task. 
4 Pilot testing with the dual task stimuli from Newton and de Villiers (2007) revealed that our participants were 
unable to attend to the videos during verbal shadowing. They also reported that the verbal shadowing task was 
significantly more difficult than the rhythmic shadowing task. 
5 In our task, this was confirmed when testing for task comprehension and in debriefing responses. 
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belief was presumably intact, the verbal interference task, by hindering inner speech, prevented 
participants from applying false belief representations. The findings of Newton and de Villiers 
(2007) may have less to do with false belief per se, and more to do with online processing of 
tasks involving multiple representations. The experimental designs of these belief-reasoning 
studies, therefore, fundamentally affected their respective results. It is concerning that relatively 
subtle differences in experimental methodology and task design between these two studies led to 
fundamentally different conclusions about false belief and ToM. As we will later discuss, this 
point parallels concerns raised by several authors about the validity of using false belief tasks as 
a proxy for ToM. 
 General verbal interference. Although verbal load did not interfere with false belief 
performance per se, Study 1 revealed that participants were less accurate on all trials — both 
false and true belief — when under verbal load as compared to spatial load, regardless of 
diagnostic group. This does not reflect a simple difference in load task difficulty; Study 2 
revealed that the two load tasks exerted similar constraints on a simple picture-matching task, 
with RT differences suggesting that the spatial load task was the more difficult one. It is possible 
that the motor demands shared between the spatial load task (performed with the left hand) and 
the mode of responding (pressing with one of the four digits on the right hand) contributed to the 
slower performance observed under spatial load. Nonetheless, it appears that, in terms of general 
attentional demands, the verbal load task used in these studies was not more taxing than the 
spatial load task. However, In Study 1, the false and true belief-reasoning tasks were both more 
affected by verbal load, suggesting that participants relied upon verbal mediation to solve both 
false and true belief tasks in this study. 
 The current experiment included four true belief trials, which were intended to act as a 
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“control” condition to which performance on false belief trials could be compared. After 
observing participants complete the task, however, we believe that the true belief trials likely 
involved more ToM – and therefore more inner speech – than anticipated, thus making them 
ineffective controls. Recall that both the false and true belief tasks involved Annie placing her 
apple in a given location, followed by the Custodian entering the room and moving her apple to a 
new location, followed by Annie looking for her apple. The only meaningful difference between 
the true and false belief trials was as follows: in the false belief condition, Annie left the room 
before the Custodian moved her apple, whereas in the true belief condition, Annie remained in 
the room. Though it is the case that only the false belief condition involved false belief per se, 
the true belief condition also required participants to track Annie’s location, and therefore her 
belief about the apple’s location. In fact, because the true belief trials were intermingled with 
false belief trials, participants may have been primed to attend to Annie’s mental state during the 
true belief trials. In other words, because participants attended to the true belief task in the 
context of the false belief task, they were required to track Annie’s mental state during both 
tasks. At the very least, both the true and false belief conditions of the task required similar 
processing demands: remembering the goal of the task, tracking the apple’s location, and 
inhibiting one response in favor of another. In general, these findings highlight the complexity of 
the relationship between false belief tasks and ToM. 
 What is the relationship between false belief and theory of mind? The discrepancy 
between the current findings and those of Newton and de Villiers (2007) underscores broader 
methodological and theoretical issues regarding ToM. The false belief task paradigm was 
originally crafted to index the emergence of ToM among preschool-aged children. Successful 
false belief task performance requires a person to appreciate that others’ actions are determined 
Running head: VERBAL MEDIATION OF TOM IN ASD 
 39 
not by the true state of the world, but by their mental representations of the world, which may or 
may not be accurate. An appreciation of others’ mental representations, however, does not 
guarantee successful false belief task performance. Indeed, most standard false belief tasks 
require the explicit application of this knowledge, which, as many authors have noted, require 
cognitive skills above and beyond ToM representation. Bloom and German (2000) argue, for 
example, that selecting the correct response on a false belief task requires an individual to 
override useful heuristics about the world. Thus, successful false belief task performance appears 
to be related to inhibitory control (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Participants’ ability to inhibit a 
“default” (true) response in favor of the correct (false) response is inherent to successful 
performance (Leslie et al., 2004). Bloom and German (2000) also argue that a person’s ToM 
need not entail the ability to reason about false beliefs. As we will discuss in sections below, 
empirical and everyday evidence points to examples of children younger than three, who would 
fail standard false belief task, demonstrating appreciation of the minds of others. 
 There is no doubt that the false belief task is a useful tool. It is important, however, that 
researchers view the false belief task as a tool for indexing a behavior associated with ToM 
rather than ToM itself. As Bloom and German (2000) state, the false belief task “is a task that 
taps one aspect of people’s understanding of the minds of others; nothing more, nothing less” 
(p.30). 
 This discussion also raises a broader question: what is ToM? Is there currently a unifying 
definition of the construct of ToM? Would such a construct even be meaningful? Apperly (2012) 
argues that, despite the existence of a consensus regarding the meaning of ToM, there are, in 
fact, at least three views of ToM implicit in research: a conceptual perspective, which assumes 
that false belief tasks index a person’s conceptual knowledge of ToM; a cognitive perspective, 
Running head: VERBAL MEDIATION OF TOM IN ASD 
 40 
which assumes that false belief tasks index a person’s capacity to contextually apply ToM; and 
the social individual differences perspective, which assumes that false belief task errors can 
occur at either the conceptual level or cognitive level of processing, depending upon the 
individual’s specific deficits (e.g., perspective-taking versus inhibitory control). Apperly (2012) 
ultimately argues that the construct of ToM itself is a straw man, as the notion of such a 
construct perpetuates the flawed assumption that ToM is a definable cognitive entity rather than 
an imperfect heuristic for representing the complexities and nuances of the social mind. Given 
the ill-defined nature of ToM, it is no surprise that identifying – much less quantifying – ToM 
remains a nebulous task. This issue is reflected in several contemporary studies, which paint a 
more nuanced picture of ToM development than previously assumed. As we will discuss below, 
several authors have worked towards a more sophisticated understanding of how people reason 
about the minds of others. 
Two systems of theory of mind. Although children younger than age four consistently fail 
traditional false belief tasks, more recent evidence, both observational and experimental, 
suggests that they do have the capacity to represent the minds of others. 
Young children are capable of attributing goals to other agents (Gergely, Nádasdy, 
Csibra, & Biro, 1995), engaging in pretend play and understanding pretense (Leslie, 1994), and 
imitating the intended (but not accidental) actions of others (Meltzoff, 1995). Indirect evidence 
also suggests that children younger than four have some form of ToM. For example, O'Neill 
(1996) found that two-year-old children were more likely to reference a toy and point to its 
location when their parent was aware of the presence of the toy (i.e., witnessed the toy being 
placed on the shelf) than when the parent was unaware. These two year olds altered their 
behavior according to the knowledge states of others. In another study, Onishi and Baillargeon 
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(2005) utilized a violation of expectations false belief paradigm to examine ToM in 15-month-
olds. They found that the infants consistently expected another person to reach to a location in 
accordance with his or her belief about a hidden toy’s location rather than the actual location of 
the toy. A similar study found that, at 13-months, infants looked significantly longer on trials in 
which an agent searched for an object in a location which was correct but inconsistent with the 
agent’s belief (Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). 
These studies demonstrate that infants as young as 13 months account for others’ beliefs 
when predicting behavior, suggesting that infants possess some sort of representational ToM 
almost two years before they pass traditional false belief tasks. How do we reconcile these 
findings with the robust literature showing that children do not pass traditional false belief tasks 
until age four? Apperly and Butterfill (2009) propose a model of two parallel systems of ToM: 
an “implicit” system, which is rapid and efficient yet inflexible, and an “explicit” system, which 
is flexible yet slow, effortful, and mediated by language. Several scholars have, in fact, proposed 
a dual process theory of cognition more generally. James wrote about “associative” or implicit 
thinking versus “true” or explicit thinking (James, 1890), and Kahneman (2003) has described 
the interplay of “intuition,” which is unconscious, fast, and automatic, and “reasoning,” which is 
conscious, slow, and governed by language.  
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggest that the implicit ToM system is pre-linguistic and 
is present in the first two years of life. The explicit ToM system, on the other hand, recruits 
domain-general executive functions, such as planning and inhibitory control (Bialystok & 
Viswanathan, 2009; Leslie et al., 2004), and therefore necessitates language. Tager-Flusberg 
(2001) also proposed a similar two-system model of ToM, with a social-perceptive (i.e., implicit) 
ToM system and a social-cognitive (i.e. explicit) ToM system. In this model, the social-
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perceptive system enables real-time, automatic social exchanges and intuitive judgments about 
the minds of others, whereas the social-cognitive system enables effortful, deliberate social 
exchanges and explicit reasoning about others’ mental states, as in the case of complex and 
executively-demanding false belief tasks. The social-cognitive system requires deliberate and 
effortful engagement, whereas the social-perceptive system is activated automatically. Typically 
developing individuals engage both ToM systems, depending upon the context, and often 
simultaneously. Some scholars have argued that the social-perceptive ToM system is innate (or is 
acquired in the first few months of life), whereas the social-cognitive system is contingent upon 
the development of language. 
Does language mediate theory of mind in ASD? In the current study, verbal load 
interfered with task accuracy in both the TD and the ASD group. However, there was an 
association between VIQ and false belief reaction time within the ASD group, such that higher 
VIQ was associated with faster RT. These findings suggest that stronger language skills in ASD 
were uniquely associated with more efficient false belief reasoning, a relationship that was not 
evident in the TD group. 
Despite the correlation between VIQ and false belief RT among participants with ASD in 
the current study, however, there was no correlation between another measure of language ability 
– CELF Core Language – and false belief RT. One potential explanation for this inconsistent 
finding relates to the CELF’s lack of sensitivity to differences in language ability. In the current 
study, for example, the lowest CELF standard score was 93. Moreover, the overall mean score 
was 112, and the SD was 10.3 (i.e., less than the expected standard score SD of 15); for the VIQ, 
mean was 10.7 and SD was 2.5, providing a wider range of scores. In contrast to VIQ scores, 
therefore, the CELF may fail to capture individual differences in language abilities. Thus, it is 
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possible that the limitations of the CELF scores account for the lack of correlation to false belief 
performance within the ASD group in this study. Another (somewhat unlikely) possibility is that 
false belief processing among ASD participants was specifically associated with expressive 
vocabulary, which was the metric of VIQ in this study, rather than more general language 
abilities, as captured by the CELF. Regardless, the lack of association between CELF Core 
language and false belief performance indicates that the VIQ/false belief finding should be 
interpreted with caution. Given these potentially conflicting results, additional study of the 
relationship between language and belief reasoning among ASD individuals is warranted. 
 Nonetheless, the relationship between VIQ and false belief processing within the ASD 
group calls into question the theory that people with ASD rely less on language for mediating 
ToM tasks. How do we explain this association between language skills and false belief-
reasoning skills within our ASD group? First, although some studies have found indirect 
evidence that people with ASD mediate cognitive tasks via visuospatial systems rather than 
language, other studies have found that people with ASD do use inner speech to mediate 
cognitive tasks, provided that they have adequate language (Williams, Happe, & Jarrold, 2008). 
In contrast to the popular idea that people with high functioning ASD “think in pictures” instead 
of words, our findings and the literature more broadly suggest that this phenomenon may not 
apply to all people with ASD in all situations. 
Still, the current results suggest that linguistic competence has a unique bearing on ToM 
in ASD, and that people with ASD rely more heavily on language to reason about beliefs. This is 
consistent with previous findings of a stronger relationship between language abilities and false 
belief task performance in ASD as compared to other populations. Happé (1995) found that, 
although lexical knowledge was associated with false belief task performance in both TD and 
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ASD groups, the level of lexical knowledge needed to pass false belief tasks was significantly 
higher for children with ASD than TD children. Another study found a stronger correlation 
between mastery of sentence complement syntax and false belief task performance within an 
ASD group than compared to a TD group (Lind & Bowler, 2009). Likewise, Fisher, Happé, and 
Dunn (2005) found a stronger association between language skills (especially grammar) and 
false belief task performance among children with ASD than children with moderate learning 
difficulties, and Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) found that production of sentence complements 
predicts belief reasoning ability. 
How do we explain this unique relationship between language and ToM in ASD? Why, 
in the current study and others, do people with ASD appear to rely more upon language when 
reasoning about others’ beliefs? One possibility relates to the two-systems account of ToM. 
Typically developing individuals may be able to rely largely upon the intuitive, and automatic 
“social-perceptive” ToM when solving false belief tasks. Because one of the signature features of 
ASD is “failure of intuitive mentalizing,” people with ASD may solve false belief tasks but 
succeed only by using the deliberate, effortful, and cognitively taxing “social-cognitive” 
approach, to reason their way through false belief tasks (Frith, 2004; Tager-Flusberg, 2001). This 
may explain why people with ASD tend to demonstrate more prominent ToM deficits in 
naturalistic as compared to laboratory settings (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Because of this 
reliance on the social-cognitive ToM system, people with ASD are especially dependent upon 
language to facilitate or “bootstrap” their false belief task performance (Joseph, McGrath, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Tager-Flusberg, 2001). For example, in the absence of representational, 
social-perceptive ToM, complement syntax affords a means of “hacking out” solutions to false 
belief tasks (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Lind & Bowler, 2009). In contrast to the theory 
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suggesting that ToM deficits result from deficits in internalized language among people with 
ASD, this theory suggests that internalized language, in fact, helps people with ASD compensate 
for deficits in social-perceptive ToM. As such, successful false belief task performance in ASD 
may not reflect the same underlying process that operates in TD. Without intuitive ToM, belief 
reasoning is a cognitively taxing process and draws more heavily on language. This explains 
why, in the current study, language skills were correlated with false belief processing among 
ASD participants but not TD participants. Moreover, the current finding that ASD participants 
were, on average, almost a full second slower than their TD peers on the belief-reasoning task is 
consistent with a slower, more deliberate “hacking-it-out” approach to belief-reasoning. 
In many circumstances (e.g., during particularly executively-demanding tasks), TD 
individuals also rely heavily on language during certain ToM tasks. The difference, however, is 
that these TD individuals are also able to draw on intuitive, social-perceptive ToM in the process 
of solving the task. Indeed, one potential extension of this theory relates to a vicious cycle 
between language and social deficits: many people with ASD have language deficits at an early 
age, which, in conjunction with their poor intuitive mentalizing, likely delays their ToM 
development, which hinders their social skills, which, in turn hinders their language 
development.6  
 Group difference in RT. In addition to the aforementioned results, we also found a fairly 
dramatic group difference in RT, where ASD participants were nearly a full second slower than 
TD participants across conditions. This finding is consistent with other research showing that 
individuals with ASD tend to have generally slower processing speed (Mayes & Calhoun, 2007) 
and slower reaction time (Schmitz, Daly, & Murphy, 2007) than their TD peers. It is interesting 
                                                
6 One alternative interpretation is that this finding is due to the fact that the TD group had less VIQ variance than the 
ASD group (TD range = 9-16 (SD = 2.0); ASD range = 5-13 (SD = 2.7)). It is therefore possible that the lack of an 
association between VIQ and false belief RT in the TD group was primarily due to this limited range of VIQ scores.  
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to note that, despite this reaction time difference, there were no group differences in accuracy. 
 Executive functions and belief reasoning RT. We found no correlation between EF or 
inhibitory control and false belief RT. This finding is particularly perplexing given the 
association between VIQ and false belief RT among ASD participants. Considering the theory 
that belief reasoning is more cognitively taxing among people with ASD, we would predict that 
EF skills would also be associated with false belief performance in this population. Given the 
necessarily small size of the ASD group, and given that this was a secondary line of inquiry in 
the present study, additional research is needed to more fully examine the relationship among 
language, EF, and belief reasoning in ASD.  
 Limitations, strengths, and future directions. There were several strengths of the current 
study. In contrast to many prior dual-task studies, our verbal and spatial interference tasks were 
comparable in terms of general attentional and cognitive resources, as confirmed by Study 2. 
Therefore, performance differences between dual task conditions were likely due to language 
demands on the system rather than general cognitive demands. Moreover, unlike some previous 
studies, our belief-reasoning task included human actors in realistic settings. 
 There were also several limitations. First, the experimenter was not naïve to diagnostic 
condition. Given that the task was computerized, this likely had negligible effects. Nonetheless, 
future studies would benefit from keeping experimenters blind to diagnostic status when 
possible. Secondly, both measures of language ability had limitations. As mentioned above, the 
restricted range of CELF scores may have limited the sensitivity of our correlational analyses. 
Moreover, although we found a significant correlation between VIQ and false belief processing 
among ASD participants, these VIQ scores were based upon a single subtest – the Stanford-Binet 
vocabulary verbal routing subtest – and should therefore be interpreted with caution. Future 
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studies may consider using more comprehensive measures of VIQ or more subtle online 
language processing measures (e.g., Eigsti & Bennetto, 2009). 
 Also, because we did not measure accuracy on the load tasks, we were unable to probe 
for tradeoffs between load and belief-reasoning tasks. Although, in our subjective assessment, all 
participants reliably engaged in the shadowing tasks during the belief-reasoning task, it is 
possible that some participants sacrificed verbal or spatial shadowing performance in favor of 
true or false belief task performance, which would not be captured in the current results. 
Additionally, although necessary given our limited sample size, the repeated-measures nature of 
the experimental design was also a study limitation given the nature of the belief-reasoning task. 
The repetition of several generally-similar false belief trials, as well as the interweaving of true 
belief trials, ultimately detracted from the original intention of the location-change false belief 
task – that is, to test one’s capacity for applying ToM in real time. The repetitious nature of the 
current task effectively detracted from the salience of ToM in solving the task, as participants 
were able to “get into set” after one or two belief task trials. Moreover, the repeated measures 
nature of the task rendered the true belief trials a poor “control” condition. That said, results from 
the first trial only were similar to results from the entire set. 
 Future investigators should be especially thoughtful about the design and demands of the 
belief-reasoning task selected. In particular, false belief tasks should be used with caution, 
especially when conducting research on adolescents and adults, for whom the classic false belief 
task may have limited utility. Relatedly, given the current lack of clarity about the relationship 
between internalized language and executive functions between ASD and TD individuals, future 
studies should also continue to include executive tasks to examine language in relation to ToM 
task performance. This would allow for more deliberate examination of various executive 
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functions as potential mediators of language and ToM. Additional research is needed to elucidate 
the relationship among language ability, internalized language, executive functions, and ToM. 
As discussed above, more systematic research is also needed to clarify the cognitive processes 
involved in ToM more generally, and to determine whether ToM is, in and of itself, a useful 
construct.  
 Conclusion. To our knowledge, the current study was the first to directly examine the 
relationship between language and internalized speech and false belief in an ASD population. 
Our findings, which were discrepant from Newton and de Villiers (2007), highlight broader 
methodological and theoretical issues within the ToM literature. Our unexpected finding of an 
association between language and false belief performance not among TD participants, but 
among ASD participants, supports the account that ToM is not a singular entity, but rather 
operates in two parallel systems: an automatic and intuitive “social-perceptive ToM,” and an 
effortful and verbally taxing “social-cognitive ToM.” Though TD individuals are able to engage 
both ToM systems, depending upon the given context, people with ASD, who tend to lack 
intuitive theory of mind, may rely on language to “bootstrap” their ToM. If supported by 
additional research, this finding would inform our conceptualization of ToM deficits in ASD. In 
fact, ASD interventions, such as social skills trainings, could yoke this compensatory strategy of 
slowly but effectively “hacking out” ToM via language. Likewise, this finding highlights the 
protective nature of language, and therefore, the importance of fostering early language skills 
among children with ASD. The “social-cognitive ToM” account of ASD certainly warrants 
further study. 
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